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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
ys

Respondent,

-

(

Case No.
13376

S T E W A R T M I C H A E L KELSEY,
Defendant and

Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This is a criminal action brought by the State of
Utah against Defendant/Appellant, Stewart Michael
Kelsey, charging him with the crime of murder in the
first degree in violation of Section 76-30-3 U.C.A., 1953.
DISPOSITION IN T H E L O W E R COURT
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District
Salt Lake County, State of Utah on the 9th day of
March, 1973, a sanity hearing was held before the Hon.
1
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Ernest F . Baldwin, Judge, and the Defendant was
found competent, able to understand the nature of the
processes against him and aid in his own defense and not
insane. Subsequently, on the 18th day of April, 1973,
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Court sitting without
a jury, Hon. D. Frank Wilkins, Judge, presiding,
found Defendant/Appellant guilty of murder in the
second degree and he was sentenced to imprisonment in
the State Prison for the indeterminate term of ten years
to life.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court dismissing
the action, or in the alternative, reversing the verdict
and judgment rendered at trial and remanding the case
to the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah for a new trial consistent with the ruling of this
Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Trial of the Appellant for the crime of murder in
the first degree under an information charging him with
violation of Section 76-30-3 commenced on April 9,1973
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Hon. D. Frank Wilkins, Judge, sitting without a jury. The Defendant
waived his right to a trial by jury in open Court and the
2
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Court found that the Defendant made a proper waiver
and further found that the waiver was voluntary, free,
knowing, intelligent and understanding and proceeded
to try the case without a jury. The State of Utah presented its case consisting of testimony and evidence
summarized as follows:
1. Diane Marie Eagle, testified that she was the
mother of the deceased, Raymond Douglas Eagle, age
three and one-half. On November 27, 1972 she left the
child playing in the back yard at 851 West Second
North, Salt Lake City, Utah in the care of the Appellant, Stewart Michael Kelsey, at approximately 1:30 in
the afternoon. (T. 18). She and the child had been living with Appellant for approximately three months,
(T. 22), during which time there had been no problems
between Kelsey and the child. (T. 26). She arrived back
home at approximately 8:00 that evening and found
that the child had been taken to the University Hospital.
(T. 24-25).
2. Mrs. Betty Herron identified herself as the
mother of Stewart Michael Kelsey, Appellant, and on
November 27, 1973, she was residing at 851 West 200
North, Salt Lake City. She arrived home at approximately 5:00 in the afternoon on that date in a cab, and
her son, Kelsey, brought the child Raymond to the cab
with bruises on his face. Mrs. Herron and Kelsey then
took the child to the University Hospital in the taxi cab.
On the way to the hospital the child started gasping for
breath, (T. 76) and Mrs. Herron attempted mouth to
3
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mouth resuscitation in order to revive him, as well as
heart massage.
Mrs. Herron arrived home from the hospital at approximately 2:30 a.m. at which time the police arrived.
Kelsey was in their custody. The police came into the
house without a search warrant and searched the bedroom, taking washcloths and clothing with them, together with a plastic bottle which Mrs. Herron used for
sprinkling clothes in preparation for ironing. (T. 86).
Mrs. Herron testified that she slept in the living room
and that Kelly, Kenneth and Stewart Michael Kelsey,
the Appellant, slept in the bedroom. Further that Kelsey had been staying with her for approximately a week,
(T. 86) or a week and a half (T. 330) was free to go in
and out of the house, that he slept there, kept his clothes
there, and had paid her some money, partly for a telephone bill and partly for groceries. (T. 331).
3. Dr. Dominic Albo, a surgeon and Assistant Professor of Surgery at the University of Utah testified
that he had performed a surgical procedure on Raymond Eagle on the night of November 27, 1972, between the hours of 4:30 and 6:30 p.m. (T. 132) at University Hospital. The child had sustained soft tissue
trauma, abrasions, and bruises around the face, eyes,
mouth and ears and his abdomen was distended. (T.
132). During the surgical operation the abdomen was
opened and blood was found in the abdomen, possibly
due to a large laceration of the liver which the doctor
identified as an explosion type of injury to the liver.
4
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(T. 133). The doctor proceeded to sew up the laceration
and the patient was prepared for additional surgery on
the head. However, the child lost consciousness, was
pronounced dead, (T. 136) and no further surgery was
performed.
4. Dr. James T. Weston, a forensic pathologist,
Physician and Chief Medical Examiner in the State of
Utah testified that he had performed a post mortem examination of a three and one-half year old child named
Raymond Eagle on November 28, 1972 at approximately 1:30 p.m. in the afternoon. (T. 279). The doctor
described the physical aspects of the child's body and
stated that the cause of death was the result of a multiplicity of internal injuries, some to the head, some to the
thorax and some to the abdomen. (T. 302). The most
fatal injury was a laceration of the liver.
5. Jerry Campbell, a police officer of Salt Lake
City Corporation testified that he had interviewed Kelsey's brother Kelly, (T. 172) age 11, at approximately
10:35 p.m. on November 27,1972. H e then interrogated
the Appellant for approximately 30 minutes after which
he read him his Fifth Amendment rights from a Miranda card. (T. 176 and 190). Thereafter, a police stenographer was called, the Miranda card read a second
time and a statement taken from Kelsey. After the
statement was taken the police officer, in the company
of Kelsey and Detective Larry Hardwick proceeded to
851 West Second North and conducted a search. Exhibit marked 13, a plastic bottle, was identified as ob5
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tained by Officer Hardwick (T. 184), as well as Exhibit 14, a dishrag which the officer testified that he had
picked up. (T. 184). The Exhibit marked 15, a washrag, was recovered from the bedroom. (T. 185). Exhibit 12, the belt, was found in the bedroom. (T. 185).
6. Larry Hardwick, police officer for Salt Lake
Corporation, Salt Lake City, Utah testified that at approximately 1:00 a.m. on the morning of November 28,
he accompanied other police officers to the house at 851
West 200 North with Kelsey in custody. A Miranda
card was read to Kelsey prior to reaching the house but
there was no discussion concerning Appellant's rights
to refuse a search of the premises. (T. 337). The officers searched the premises without first obtaining the
permission of Kelsey (T. 338) and without a search
warrant, (T. 339) and obtained several articles identified as a belt, a washrag, a dishcloth and a plastic bottle.
7. Rhea Hill, stenographer, testified that she took
down the statement of the Defendant in shorthand. On
the stand she made corrections of the statement from her
notes. (T. 257-263). The stenographer testified that
when the officer read the Miranda warning to the Appellant he read it so fast that she was unable to take it
down and that she copied it afterwards from the card.
(T. 257).
Other witnesses were called by the State who did
not contribute anything of significance to the evidence
adduced against the Appellant. Appellant presented
the following evidence on defense :
6
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1. (a.) Stewart Michael Kelsey took the stand for
the limited purpose of testifying to the fact that he had
not given a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.
Each time the Miranda card was read to him he understood it as meaning that he would have to make a statement in any case and that he would not be able to remain silent if an attorney were called.
(b.) Appellant's testimony was corroborated by
Mr. Gilbert Athay, Legal Defense Association, who
had been called to defend Kelsey on November 28, 1972
(T. 208-210) and interviewed Kelsey just after he was
returned to jail following the search at 851 West Second North.
(c.) Richard S. Shepard, Deputy County Attorney, testified that he accompanied the police officers
when they went to the residence for the search, and had
borrowed a Miranda card from one of the officers and
read it to Kelsey in the police car. Richard Shepard
testified that he was concerned that Kelsey did not appreciate the gravity of the situation (T. 223) and that
he felt that Appellant had to understand that he and
Mr. Cone, the police officer, were not his friends. " W e
were the persons who were going to try and put him in
prison so he should be careful about what he said when
he was around us." (T. 224),
2. Dr. Lewis G. Moench and Dr. Eugene Bliss had
made a preliminary psychiatric examination of Kelsey
and determined that he was competent to stand trial and
aid in his defense. At the trial, Dr. Moench testified that

7
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he had found that Kelsey had dull normal intelligence
and had a character disorder known as a sociopathic
personality, which manifests itself in an inability or diminished ability to control his emotional reaction when
provoked. (Drs. Report) ; that Kelsey does not solve
problems by rational judgment and his ability to think
things out in time of crisis is terribly diminished (T.
338). That the Defendant Reacts very little to stimuli
until a threshold is reached when sudden or explosive
reactions occur (T. 365) ; that the Defendant did not
have sufficient time to consider what he was doing (T.
378), nor the ability (T. 379), to weigh the consequences of what was going on at the time; that at the
time Kelsey hit the child in the stomach he was acting
impulsively, (T. 379) that the fact that he tried to revive the child by giving him first aid, and also tried to
make the child walk, exhibited the fact that Kelsey was
presented with a situation which he did not know how to
handle, but he was frightened and angry and that he
was simply attempting to make the child prove to him
that he was not injured. (T. 379 and 385). The doctor
also testified that there was nothing in his examination
which indicated that Kelsey had planned in advance to
hurt the child (T. 385) that "he was simply frightened
and angered because he was presented with a problem
he couldn't handle." The doctor testified that, in his
opinion, Kelsey was emotionally overcharged at the
time of the incident due to an altercation with his stepfather the day before and also the fact that he was coming down from a dose of amphetamines taken the previous day (T. 387).

8
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3. Dr. James Weston was called on behalf of the
defense and qualified as a forensic pathologist, with
expertise in the area of the "battered child." Dr. Weston testified that Kelsey followed a pattern of a socioeconomic-cultural problem in the category of the abuse
of a child by a paramour. That in such case, the paramour who is living with the mother and a child not his
own tends to have resentment and jealousy of the child
and at some time in their relationship may lash out
against the child if provoked, even in a minor way. (T.
407). That Kelsey's educational and psychiatric background together with his relationship with the mother
of the child and the child itself indicated that Kelsey
fitted into this category. (T. 412).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E T R I A L C O U R T E R R E D IN A C C E P T ING APPELLANT'S WAIVER OF A J U R Y
W H E N H E WAS CHARGED W I T H FIRST
DEGREE MURDER.
The Defendant waived his right to a jury trial in
open Court and the Judge found that the waiver was
valid and voluntary, accepted Appellant's waiver and
heard the case without a jury.
Section 77-27-2, U.C.A., 1953, provides:
I n all cases except where a sentence of death
may be imposed, the trial by jury may be waived
by the defendant. (Emphasis added)
9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Clearly, defendants may waive a jury in all cases
except capital cases. No other interpretation can be
made of Section 77-27-2 in view of the words "except
where a sentence of death may be imposed."
Kelsey was charged and tried for the crime of first
degree murder. The penalty for first degree murder is
set forth in Section 76-30-4, U.C.A., 1953, which provides :
Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or, upon the recommendation of the jury, may be imprisoned at hard
labor in the state prison for life, in the discretion
of the court. . . . (Emphasis added).
This Court has interpreted Section 76-30-4 in the case
of State v. Markham, 100 Utah 226, 112 P.2d 496
(1941).
The death sentence is mandatory for first degree
murder unless the jury recommends a different
penalty, when it becomes discretionary.
I t is to be noted that the statute concerning the penalty for murder in the first degree grants discretion to
the jury and not to the Court. In a case of the Court
sitting without a jury, therefore, the Court would have
no discretion to recommend leniency upon a conviction
of first degree murder, and the death sentence would be
absolutely mandatory. Thus such a waiver falls directly
under the proscription of waiver as set forth in Section
77-27-2.
The general rule in the courts of the United States
is that a full jury of twelve cannot be waived by a De10
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fendant upon a plea of not guilty in a felony case, except upon express authority of a statute or the constitution of the state involved. (See 48 A L R 767, 58 A L R
1031, 70 A L R 279, 47 Am J u r 2d, Jury, 72.) Our
statute which allows such a waiver in most felony cases,
expressly excepts waiving a jury in a capital case and
the acceptance of the Appellant's waiver of the jury
constitutes reversible error.
In the case of Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 42
L.ed. 1061, 18 S.Ct. 620, (1889), the Defendant was
tried by an eight man jury under a statute of the territory of Utah which reduced the number of jurors from
twelve to eight. The Supreme Court of the United
States stated:
I t was not in the power of a person accused of
felony by consent expressly given or by his silence to authorize a jury of only eight persons to
pass upon the question of his guilt.
In the Thompson case, the defendant had simply acquiesed in the trial of his case by a jury of eight in view
of the statute. However, in the case of Low v. U.S., 169
F . 86 (6th Cir. 1909), the defendat had waived a jury.
The court reversed the conviction saying:
Undoubtedly the accused has a right to waive
everything which pertains to form and much
which is of the structure of a trial. But he may
not waive that which concerns both himself and
the public, nor any matter which involves fundamentally the jurisdiction of the Court. The jurisdiction of the Court to pronounce a judgment or
conviction for crime, when there has been a plea
11
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of not guilty, rests upon the foundation of a verdict by a jury. Without that basis the judgment
is void.
In neither the Thompson case nor the Low case,
was the Court confronted with a statute which allowed
waiver by a defendant in a felony case. But our statute
expressly prohibits a waiver of a jury in a capital case.
The Appellant had no power to waive a jury, and the
Court's acceptance of his waiver, whether made voluntarily or not, is incredible in the face of Section 77-27-2
U.C.A., 1953, which was cited to the Court. Nothing in
the record shows the basis on which the Court ruled that
such a waiver was acceptable.
During the time Kelsey was charged, tried and
convicted the status of capital punishment was, and still
is, unsetled, due to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 33 L.ed. 2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972), which, it
was widely assumed, abolished capital punishment as
being cruel and unusual punishment and in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. However, a careful reading of the Furman decision reveals that the decision did
not abolish capital punishment; first, because the decision was limited to the three cases at bar, and second, because the decision does not abolish capital punishment
per se, but only the discretion of a court or jury to impose capital punishment. Of the five opinions constituting the majority of the Court, three Justices, Mr.
Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice
12
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Stewart specifically stated that they did not reach the
decision of whether a mandatory death sentence in
which the Judge or jury did not have discretion, would
be unconstitutional. The statute providing for punishment of first degree murder in the State of Utah provides that the death sentence is mandatory as interpreted in State v. Markham, supra, and Furman v.
Georgia does not apply. See Mr. Justice Ellett's dissent
in State v. James, 30 Utah 2d 32, 512 P.2d 1031 (1973).
Even if Furman v. Georgia abolished capital punishment in the State of Utah, however, the crime of first
degree murder is still a "capital" crime. This Court has
held in two cases, since the U. S. Supreme Court rendered its decision in Furmam, that nothing in that case
can be construed to abrogate our fundamental law and
that under the Constitution and statutes of the State of
Utah the crime of first degree murder is still a "capital"
offense. In the case of State v. James, supra, the Trial
Court in a hearing in chambers prior to the trial ruled
that since Furman v. Georgia abolished capital crimes,
the Defendant, charged with first degree murder, was
entitled only to an eight man jury as provided in Section 78-48-5 U.C.A., 1953. Upon appeal this Court reversed, stating:
Capital cases, as this term is used in Article I,
Section 10, of the Utah Constitution refers to a
category of criminal actions including therein the
entire prosecution and not merely the last stage,
the penalty phase. Furman v. Georgia is limited
to this final phase of the action, the imposition
and execution of the death penalty. Murder in
13
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the first degree has been classified as a capital
crime by the legislature; Furman affected only
the punishment; the nature of the crime remains
unchanged. Defendant was entitled to a trial by
a twelve man jury; the trial court committed
prejudicial error when it denied him this right.
(Emphasis in original).
The same result was reached in Roll v. Larsen, 30
Utah 2d 273, 516 P.2d 1392 (1973) in interpreting Section 77-43-3, U.C.A., 1953, which provides that a defendant charged with a crime "punishable by death"
may be admitted to bail only by a Judge of the Supreme
or District Court.
Trial by a twelve man jury in a capital case is a
part of our fundamental law. Article I Section 10 of
the Utah Constitution provides that the right to trial by
jury shall remain inviolate. Appellant was entitled to a
trial by a twelve man jury and had no power to waive
the jury. The trial Court was in error when it denied
him this right, in view of the statute of this State specifically denying the Appellant the power to waive a
jury, and had no jurisdiction to pronounce judgment in
the absence of a jury. The judgment of the Court below
should be reversed.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS
THE STATEMENT M A D E BY APPELLANT
TO THE POLICE WITHOUT BENEFIT OF
COUNSEL.
14
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A. A P P E L L A N T D I D N O T K N O W I N G L Y
AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVE HIS F I F T H
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AT T H E TIME OF
G I V I N G A S T A T E M E N T TO T H E P O L I C E .
The Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.ed. 2d
694, 86 S.Ct 1602 (1966), held that a confession obtained by the police without the presence of counsel
representing the Defendant may be admitted in Court
as evidence only if the Defendant has knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel. Further, the
Court held that a substantial burden is on the government to prove that the Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights. In the case
at bar the government has failed to meet that burden
of proof.
After substantial in-custody interrogation of the
Defendant, the police read to Kelsey a "Miranda" card
designed to enable the police to advise defendants of
their rights in accordance with the Miranda decision. In
an attempt to obtain a waiver of Appellant's rights Kelsey was asked by the police officers if he understood the
rights and if he wished to talk to them. Each time the
Miranda card was read to Kelsey he did not understand
what was being read to him. Taking the stand for the
limited purpose of testifying to the voluntariness of the
confession Kelsey was asked by Mr. Hill:
Q. O.K., now, did Officer Campbell subsequently read to you, 'If you wish to answer questions
now without contacting a lawyer and without a
15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lawyer present you have the right to stop answering questions at any time?' Did he read that to
you?
A. Yes.
Q. What did that mean to you?
A. That meant if I didn't have a lawyer there, if
I decided not to talk to them I wouldn't have to,
and if I had a lawyer there that I would have to
go ahead and talk to them anyway. Even though
a lawyer was there I would still have to talk to
them.
Q. But that if you talked with them right away
without having a lawyer, that you could quit at
any time?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you advise anyone of this at a later time?
A. Yes, when Gil Athay came to the jail, when
they took me to the jail, I told Gil Athay about

it

Q. Is that why you didn't ask for an attorney to
be present?
A. Yes. (T. 199).
Upon cross examination Mr. VanDam asked Kelsey:
Q. And you didn't understand that you had the
right to remain silent?
A. No, I didn't understand that at the time.
Q. That sentence doesn't mean anything to you?
Q. Do you or don't you understand that when
you say that to you?
16
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A. In a way I do and in a way I don't.
Q. Will you explain to me how you do or don't,
please?
A. When they was reading it to me it didn't
come out exactly the way 'you have the right to
remain silent'. Officer McCurdy came back and
says 'If you wish to talk to us now you can stop
talking any time you want to'. (T. 202)
Mr. Gil Athay, Legal Defender's office, was called
to represent Appellant after Kelsey was brought back
to jail and after he had given the statement to the police.
Mr. Athay testified (T. 210) that when he talked with
Kelsey, he "responded to me that it was his understanding from what he had been told that he had to give the
statement, that if he asked for a lawyer, he would not be
able to stop talking. H e indicated that he understood
from what he had been told that he had to talk to them if
a lawyer showed up, and once he began to talk with a
lawyer present, he would have to continue to talk until
the police told him he was through."
The testimony of both Kelsey and Mr. Athay show
clearly that Kelsey had a fundamental lack of understanding of his right to silence and the reading to him
from the Miranda card did nothing to enlighten him of
his rights. The essence of the Miranda decision is not
that the police must perform a ritual of reading from a
card prior to obtaining a statement from a defendant
but that the police must first obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of the rights by advising the defendant
of his constitutional right to silence and being sure that
the defendant understands those rights and the conse17
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quences of waiving them. The Court in the Miranda
case stated (P. 476):
The requirement of warnings and waiver of
rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth
Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.
(Emphasis added)
Kelsey did not understand his rights and could
therefore not give a knowing and intelligent waiver of
those rights. A waiver is an abandonment of a known
right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 82 L.ed. 1461,
58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938). By Kelsey's testimony and that
of Mr. Gil Athay who interviewed him shortly after he
gave his statement, he was confused. Other testimony
corroborates the fact that Kelsey was confused and
could not have given a knowing and intelligent waiver
of rights at the time. The stenographer, Rhea Hill,
testified (T. 201) that at the time the rights were read
to Kelsey prior to taking his statement they were read
so fast that she could not take them down in shorthand.
The process smacks of a ritual reading by the police.
Richard Shepard, Deputy County Attorney, testified
(T. 223) that Kelsey was confused about the fact that
he did not know an attorney. Richard Shephard, who
rode with the police and Kelsey in the police car after
the statement was taken by the police testified:
I was concerned at the time that he did not appreciate the gravity of the matter . . . (T. 225)
and further:
18
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I believe there was something to the effect either
by Mr. Cone or by myself that he had to understand that we were not his friends. W e were the
persons who were going to try and put him in
prison so he should be careful about what he said
when he was around us. (T. 224)
The Court in Miranda stated, page 469:
It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real
understanding and intelligent exercise of the
privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to
make the individual acutely aware that he is
faced with a phase of the adversary system, that
he is not in the presence of persons acting solely
in his interest. (Emphasis added.)
Kelsey did not understand these things. According to
Richard Shephard, the Defendant did not understand
that the police were not his friends, nor did he understand the consequences of waiving his privilege to the
extent required before he could intelligently and knowingly waive those privileges, under Miranda v. Arizona.
The State did not bring forth any evidence to prove
that the Defendant understood his rights in any way
other than the way in which he stated on the stand, although the State had the burden of proving that he
waived his Fifth Amendment rights in a knowing and
intelligent manner. This Court has stated that it is in
agreement that the privilege against self incrimination
includes a warning concerning those rights given by the
police and that the burden is on the prosecution to prove
that the statement is given voluntarily. State v. Lopez,
22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969).
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I t is clear from the record that Kelsey was in a situation in which he was being swept along in the current
of events, was intimidated by the apparent authority of
the police and did not understand that he had a right to
stand silent before them in spite of their interrogation.
Kelsey did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver
of his Fifth Amendment rights and the Court's admission of the statement constitutes prejudicial error when
such a waiver was not made.
B. T H E S T A T E M E N T G I V E N TO T H E
P O L I C E B Y A P P E L L A N T W A S N O T VOLUNTARILY GIVEN.
Kelsey was taken to the police station at approximately 9:00 p.m. and questioned until approximately
11:35 p.m. when his statement was taken down by a
stenographer. (T. 195 and 193). During the interim
Kelsey was kept by himself, out of communication with
the rest of his family or of anyone else except the police.
During this time Kelsey's little brother, Kelly, was
questioned by the police. Kelly was a child, age 11,
whom the Court found to be incompetent to testify as a
witness because he was highly suggestible and tended to
fantasize.
According to the testimony of Officer Gail McCurdy in both the preliminary hearing and the trial of
the case, Officer McCurdy interrogated Kelly out of
the presence of Kelsey and later, together with Sergeant Johnson confronted Kelsey with the statement
given by his little brother. At that time Kelsey gave a
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statement to the police which led to the formal recorded
statement some one half hour later. (T. 174) In the first
interrogation by the police, Kelsey had not been booked
nor charged (R. 84), he had not been advised of his
rights (T. 176), nor did the Defendant know how badly
the child was hurt or that he had died. The first that
Kelsey knew that he was to be charged with first degree
murder was when Richard Shephard so informed him
long after the statement had been given (T. 206).
I t is to be noted that Miranda was questioned for
two hours, the same period of time Kelsey was interrogated prior to giving his statement.
The courts of this country have long been very suspicious of a confession given by a defendant in a felony
case where the defendant did not have the benefit of
counsel. In the case of Escobedo v. California, 378 U.S.
478,12 L.ed. 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758 (1964) the court stated
on page 489:
W e have learned the lesson of history, ancient
and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend upon the confession will in the long run be less viable and
more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.
Later in the case of Miranda, supra, the United States
Supreme Court reiterated the Escobedo case stating:
(p. 469)
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear
21
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the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to
have counsel present at interrogation is indispensible to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate
today.
And again on page 476:
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to
the waiver of rights by an accused, the fact of
lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his
rights. In these circumstances the fact that the
individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to
do so. I t is inconsistent with any notion of voluntary relinquishment of the privilege.
In Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 84 L.ed. 716, 60
S.Ct. 472 (1940), the United States Supreme Court
stated that coercion can be mental as well as physical
and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition. Further, in the
case of Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, page 464:
The determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must
depend in each case upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case, including
the background, experience and conduct of the
accused.
Kelsey was found by the psychiatrists to be of dull
normal intelligence. I t is not surprising that Kelsey was
easily overwhelmed by the authority of the police in this
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situation. H e was unaware of the gravity of the injuries
received by the child or the fact that he had died and was
further unaware of the consequences to himself in making a statement to the police. Further, he had been interrogated for a period of two hours and was finally
confronted by three policemen, McCurdy, Johnson and
Campbell, without aid of legal counsel or without the
benefit of any friend at the police station. H e was told
his little brother Kelly had informed the police of the
true circumstances concerning the child's injuries. Even
after he was informed of his rights, Kelsey believed that
the interrogation would continue until a confession was
obtained, whether or not he had an attorney present. As
the court in the Miranda case indicated on page 468:
It is not just the sub-normal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator's imprecations whether implied or expressly stated, that
the interrogations will continue until a confession
is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury.
In this case the Appellant was both sub-normal and
woefully ignorant and no statement given by him under
these circumstances can be said to have been given voluntarily within the meaning of the rules set forth in the
Miranda, Zerbst, Chambers and Escobedo cases, and
the admission of Appellant's statement was prejudicial
error.
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POINT III
T H E COURT E R R E D IN D E N Y I N G A P P E L L A N T ' S M O T I O N TO S U P P R E S S E V I D E N C E
TAKEN FROM APPELLANT'S RESIDENCE.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States guarantees each citizen to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, house,
papers and effects. Where a search is made without a
warrant, as it was in this case, it is presumed to be unreasonable unless such search is made incident to a valid
arrest for the purpose of self-protection of the police
against weapons and to prevent escape or unless the objects searched for were in plain view of the officers.
Chimel vs. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L.ed. 2d 685, 89
S.Ct. 2034 (1969). Otherwise, clear and unequivocal
evidence must be presented that the person whose rights
are secured by the Fourth Amendment gave intelligent
and specific consent to the search. Nerrel vs. Superior
Court of Orange County, 97 Cal. Rep. 702 (1971),
Wren vs. U.S., 352 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1965).
I t is evident in this case that this search was not
made incident to an arrest, since at the time of the search
Kelsey was already under arrest. There was no danger
of his escaping and no personal danger to the officers
involved. This ground for a warrantless search is absent
where the search occurs in a remote time or place from
the actual arrest. Chimel v. California, supra. Further,
the burden on the government is particularly heavy in
a case where the individual is already under arrest at the
24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

time of the search. Coercion is more easily found if the
defendant is in custody since the defendant is more
likely to be overwhelmed by the authority of the police
especially where the police are carrying guns (T. 338),
where the defendant is in handcuffs (T. 98) and where
there are a number of officers.
Non resistance to the orders or suggestions of the
police is not infrequent in such a situation; true
consent, free of fear or pressure is not so readily
to be found. Judd v. U.S., 190 F.2d 649 (D.C,
Cir. 1951)
There is no question that Kelsey did not waive his
constitutional rights in this instance. H e was neither
asked permission to enter and search the house nor was
he advised that anything obtained from the house could
be used in evidence against him. (T. 338). Just as in
the case of waiver of Fifth and Sixth Amendment,
waiver of a warrantless search and seizure can only be
valid if the defendant knows that he has a right to deny
the search. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. In the case of
Cipres v. U.S., 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), the Ninth
Circuit reversed the Trial Court which had found that
the defendant had voluntarily waived her Fourth
Amendment right because she answered "yes" to the
police's question of whether they could open her bags.
The Court stated that the issue was whether Cipres had
waived her constitutional immunity from unreasonable
search and seizure. Waiver in this context means "intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege/'
said the Court, and "such a waiver cannot be conclusive-
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ly presumed from a verbal expression of assent." The
Court must determine from all the circumstances
whether the verbal assent reflected an understanding,
uncoerced and unequivocal election to grant the officers
a license which the person knows may be freely and
effectively withheld.
Even though there is some testimony to the effect
that Kelsey assisted the police officers in conducting the
search, inasmuch as he picked up the belt after they had
arrived at the premises, this cannot be construed as having given consent since at that time he did not know that
he had a right to refuse the police to search the premises
and the record is absolutely devoid of anything indicating that he did have such knowledge.
However, the State argued that Mrs. Herron, who
paid the rent on the premises had given her consent to
the search. Mrs. Herron likewise was not advised by the
police that they did not have a warrant and that under
the circumstances she had a right to refuse a search of
the premises. In response to the question as to why she
had let the police in the house, Mrs. Herron said "Well,
I wanted to be a law abiding citizen." (T. 99). The implication is clear that Mrs. Herron did not realize that
she could be a law abiding citizen by standing on her
rights and refusing entry to the police. It is equally
clear that Mrs. Herron was overwhelmed by the authority of the police and that any consent that she gave at
that time was not a valid waiver of her Fourth Amendment rights. Judd v. U.S., supra.
Even if Mrs. Herron had given a knowing and in26
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telligent waiver of her own right to be free from a warrantless search and seizure, she cannot waive the rights
of the defendant. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 11
L.ed. 2d 856, 84 S.Ct. 889 (1964). Most of the items
obtained through the search and seizure were found in
the bedroom, one of them under the bedding on the bed.
Mrs. Herron did not use that bedroom and no one who
had the use of the bedroom gave consent to the search.
Appellant and his mother had an agreement that he
would give her room and board for staying there. (T.
335). However, he had only been there for a week and
no payment on the room and board was yet due. H e had,
however, given her $40.00, part of which went toward
buying the groceries. Kelsey was a tenant of Mrs. Herron under the meaning of Stoner v. California, and had
a right to be free from an unlawful search and seizure,
even if the owner of the premises gave consent.
Under circumstances such as this, there is no reason
for the police not to obtain a warrant before they search.
There was no danger of the Defendant escaping from
them, there was no personal danger to the police and
the police had plenty of time in which to obtain such a
warrant. The Fourth Amendment is directed against
warrantless searches and in most cases the entire problem of unreasonable search and seizure could be cured
easily if the police were required first to obtain a warrant before they set out to pick up evidence. Since there
was no warrant obtained and no valid consent given for
the search the prosecution may not utilize the fruits of
the search at trial Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L.ed.
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2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961), and the Court committed prejudicial error in allowing such evidence to be
admitted.
P O I N T IV
T H E R E IS NO E V I D E N C E OF M A L I C E
A F O R E T H O U G H T ON T H E P A R T O F A P P E L L A N T U P O N W H I C H TO BASE T H E
C O U R T S J U D G M E N T OF SECOND D E G R E E
M U R D E R , OR U P O N W H I C H TO B A S E T H E
COURT'S CONCLUSION OF L A W N U M B E R
TWO.
Section 76-30-1 U.C.A., 1953, defines murder as
follows:
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought.
In the case of State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170
P.2d 153 (1946) this Court stated "there can be no murder without malice aforethought, which means planned,
designed and thought out beforehand."
I n this case the Defendant neither planned, designed nor thought out beforehand the actual killing nor
did he give thought prior to his action of any malicious
feelings or desires. There was no malice connected with
the injuries inflicted upon the child. The Defendant
acted solely out of fear. According to the testimony by
Dr. Moench, which was uncontroverted by the prosecution, the Defendant was frightened because he was presented with a situation he did not know how to handle.
Dr. Moench testifies:
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My opinion was that he encountered a situation
that he didn't know how to handle. H e was
frightened and angry and as he attempted to
make the child prove to him that he was not injured, the child couldn't prove that he was not
injured by getting up and walking as he asked
him to do or ordered him to do, and so this, I
think, would make him angry and frightened and
he would lash out at the child, trying to make the
child remove the cause of his anger and fear. I
think he was frightened repeatedly, and he attempted to make this little child remove this anger. (T. 379)
Here is the situation. A twenty year old boy, of
dull intelligence, is left to babysit with a three and onehalf year old child. The mother has left the house without telling the child she is going to go. The Appellant
has known the child and lived with it for the past three
months and believes the child to be a bit spoiled and
somewhat of a momma's boy. (T. 378). It is to be assumed that the Appellant expects the child to make
some fuss when he discovers that the mother has left
him. The child is in the back yard playing on a rickety
slide. The Appellant hears a noise in the back yard and
believes the child has fallen off the slide. The Appellant
races outside where he finds the child on the ground
crying. H e believes the child is malingering and making
more of a fuss than is necessary, and strikes the child
with his belt a couple of times in order to make him behave. This punishment is severe, but the Appellant has
dull intelligence and it conforms with the punishments
he has seen inflicted by his parents as well as punish29
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ment he has received himself. At this point the child's
injuries are certainly not such as would cause the Appellant to believe that they were fatal. However, the
child is bleeding. Perhaps he really has been hurt in his
fall from the slide. Kelsey takes the child inside, wipes
the blood away and tries to make the child walk in an
attempt to prove that he was not injured in the fall from
the slide. However the child cannot or will not walk.
The Appellant becomes frightened. H e has no one to
turn to for advice or help. H e has no telephone and no
car. The child has not proved that he is not injured and
Kelsey is unable to tell how badly injured the child is.
H e lashes out at the child and hits him again through
fear. The Defendant is afraid to allow the child to go to
sleep. H e pours water over his head in an attempt to
revive him. The child keeps falling down and the Appellant still not knowing what to do, afraid because he
does not know what to do and completely unaware that
he himself is causing the injuries lashes out at the child
again.
Kelsey's actions in this situation were very unfortunate. They show the dull intelligence of the Appellant, and his inability to act in a thoughtful and rational
manner during a crisis, but they do not show malice
aforethought on the part of Kelsey, or any intent to
cause such bodily injury as might result in death. There
is no evidence presented by the State on this point. The
only evidence presented to explain the Appellant's actions in this instance is that of Dr. Moench the psychiatrist. H e testified that in his opinion Kelsey had no pre30
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meditation to injure the child. H e testified that it was
his opinion that Kelsey did not even intend to harm the
child. Mr. Van Dam on cross examining Dr. Moench
asked:
Q. Doctor, you have characterized the first part
or you have said, let me put it this way, that you
felt there was no premeditation prior to this act
on the part of the Defendant to harm the child.
Now what about more specifically once this event
was under way.
A. I think once the events were under way the
actions were largely impulsive. H e was simply
frightened and angry because he was presented
with a problem he couldn't handle. The child had
been left in his custody. The child appeared injured. H e didn't know how to deal with it and he
was trying to, in fact, I think, make the child
deny the reality of the injury. (T. 385).
Mr. Hill asked the Doctor on re-direct:
Q. Doctor, on cross examination the subject was
also brought up about attempts to care for or aid
the child during this altercation. Does that have
any significance to you. Do you have an opinion
as to what they might mean?
A. I t would be my opinion that these attempts at
first aid or rehabilitation of the child indicated
that there was not the intent to harm the child or
not the plan to harm the child. Otherwise why
attempt to rehabilitate? (T. 387 Emphasis added.)
There was no intent to harm the child. Where there
is no intent to do great bodily injury the action cannot
be defined as murder. Criminal intent is a basic factor
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which must be proved before a court or jury can convict of murder or any other crime. I t is expressed in the
requirement that there can be no murder without malice
aforethought.
Malice aforethought has been defined by this
Court in the case of State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145
P.2dl003 (1944).
I n order to have the necessary malice to commit
murder (not necessarily in the first degree) the
killing must be unlawful, it must result from or
be caused by an act or omission to act committed
with one of the following intentions: (1) an intention or design previously formed to kill or
cause great bodily injury or (2) an intention or
design previously formed to do an act or omit to
do an act knowing that the reasonable and natural consequences thereof would be likely to
cause death or great bodily injury; or (3) a previously thought out intentional or designed perpetration or attempt to perpetrate one of certain
kinds of felonies. (Emphasis added)
I n view of the definition of malice aforethought in
the Russell case the State has the burden of proving
that the defendant previously thought out beforehand
and intended to do great bodily injury to the child. The
State produced no evidence whatsoever to show such intent and malice aforethought. The only evidence in the
transcript concerning the issue is the testimony of Dr.
Moench. The Doctor testified:
I t is my opinion that this was an impulsive action
and not an act of judgment or premeditation.
(T. 367)
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I think that once the events were under way the
actions were largely impulsive. (T. 385)
In the account of the experience and in the confession both there didn't seem to be any delay.
There seemed to be a situation and then an immediate reaction rather than time to think or
ponder or to ask for help or opinions from others
until apparently the child was so badly injured
and the Defendant's mother came home and intervened. (T. 369)
The definition of malice aforethought in the Russell case is supported in the case of State v. Trujillo,
117 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153, p. 251:
Malice aforethought is a state of mind. The
aforethought is the giving thought beforehand to
malicious feeling or desires. . . . Thus when murder is defined as the unlawful killing oOiuman
being after giving thought beforehand to the de-^
sire to kill or to cause great bodily injury or to
do an act knowing that its reasonable and natural \
consequences would be death or great bodily injury. (Emphasis added)
The Court made a specific finding of fact that at
the time of the inflicting of the injuries the Appellant
intended to cause great bodily harm to the victim or
should have known the reasonable consequences of his
actions as dangerous to the victim. However there is
absolutely no evidence in the record upon which to base
such a Finding of Fact. There is substantial evidence to
show that Kelsey had no intent to harm the child but
none to show that he had such an intent or malice toward
the child. The Court in addition specifically found that
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"the psychiatric examination revealed that the Defendant has a diminished capacity to control his impulses
under circumstances similar to those which existed during the time he was attacking the victim Raymond
Eagle." The two findings of fact cannot be reconciled.
Either Kelsey acted in an impulsive manner as shown
by the extensive evidence in this case, or he had previously formed an intent to harm the child, and the
record in this case is absolutely devoid of any evidence
showing such intent. The Court concludes from these
two Findings of Fact:
In view of the psychiatric testimony regarding
the defendant's inability to control himself in
some degree, the Court finds that the killing was
not premeditated and that the murder was therefore not murder in the first degree but murder
in the second degree.
The Court has grossly misconstrued the law in this context. For if Kelsey is found to be unable to control
himself in his impulses then he cannot have intended to
harm the child and has not acted with malice aforethought. The Appellant's inability is not a mitigation
of his actions which would reduce the crime from first
degree to second degree murder but constitutes a complete defense, since it shows that he acted without
malice, and without malice there can be no murder,
either first or second degree. The Court's Findings of
Fact are absolutely unsupported by the evidence and
the Court's Conclusions of Law as drawn from those
facts, are contrary to law. Where the Appellant's had
no criminal intent and no malice aforethought the Court
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erred in finding him guilty of second degree murder
and the judgment should be reversed.
POINT V
T H E F I N D I N G S O F F A C T A N D CONCLUSIONS OF L A W A R E CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY
THE EVIDENCE
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
entered in accordance with Rule 52, U.R.C.P., and
Section 77-44-2 U.C.A., 1953. Said Findings of Fact
are not substantiated by the evidence and the Conclusions of Law drawn therefrom are clearly erroneous.
By Finding of Fact number three, the Court found
that Kelsey either intended to cause bodily harm to the
victim (which is entirely unsubstantiated by the evidence) or he should have known the reasonable consequences of his actions as dangerous to the victim. The
only evidence in the record on this point is the testimony of Dr. Weston and Dr. Moench, each of whom
testified that the actions of the Defendant in this case
were impulsive, and not premeditated and that he had
no intent to harm the child. Further, said Finding of
Fact is in conflict with Finding of Fact number five
wherein the Court found that the Defendant had diminished capacity to control his impulses. The Court in
effect is finding both that the actions of the Defendant
were impulsive and that they were intentional. The
Court concludes from these facts in Conclusion of Law
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number four that since the Defendant was unable to
control himself he could not have premeditated the killing and thereby admits that since the actions were impulsive they could not have been intentional.
Conclusions of Law numbers two and three are not
supported by any Finding of Fact. The Court concludes that the beating was done intentionally and with
malice aforethought willful, deliberate and malicious.
Malice is defined by Section 76-30-2 of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as follows:
Malice defined—Such malice may be express or
implied. I t is express when there is manifested a
deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of
a fellow creature. I t is implied where no considerable provocation appears or where the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned
and malignant heart.
Said section clearly demonstrates that in order to
have malice aforethought, the defendant must have an
intention to kill. The Court found as a matter of fact
that the Defendant intended to cause bodily harm or
should have known that his actions were dangerous, not
that he intended to kill, and Kelsey had no such intent
to kill. Further, the Court did not find as a matter of
fact that the malice aforethought was implied. In order
to make such a conclusion the Court would have to find
that the Defendant had an abandoned and malignant
heart. There is no such Finding of Fact. In addition
there is no Finding of Fact touching upon the provocation, whether considerable or slight. The evidence shows
that Kelsey was provoked time after time and that he
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impulsively struck out against the child in response to
such provocation. Conclusion of Law numbers two and
three are clearly erroneous as they are not supported
by the evidence nor by any Finding of Fact made by
the Court.
Conclusion number four entered by the Court is
clearly erroneous. Evidently, since the Court found that
the Defendant is unable to control his impulses it concluded that the killing was not premeditated and the
murder was not first degree but murder in the second
degree. Nothing in the statutes nor the case law warrants such a conclusion. If Kelsey's inability to control
himself was such as to make the Court doubt his sanity
then such inability does not merely reduce the crime
from first to second degree murder but is a complete
defense and the Appellant should be acquitted. State
V. Green, 86 Utah 192, 40 P.2d 961 (1935). On the
other hand if Kelsey's inability to control his impulses
was an "emotional disturbance which rendered his mind
incapable of cool reflection" then he had no malice
aforethought and the crime was not murder in any degree. State v. Leggroan, 25 Utah 2d 32, 475 P . 2d
57 (1970); see especially Judge Crockett's dissent in
said case.
Since the Findings of Fact were clearly erroneous
and not supported by subtantial evidence and the Conclusions of Law clearly show an erroneous view of the
law, the judgment should be reversed and a new trial
granted. William v. U.S., 267 F.2d 559 (10th Cir.
1959).
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P O I N T VI
T H E TRIAL WAS INCOMPLETE SINCE
T H E F I N D I N G S O F F A C T A N D CONCLUSIONS OF L A W W E R E NOT E N T E R E D BY
T H E J U D G E W H O H E A R D T H E EVIDENCE
Section 77-44-2 U.C.A., 1953, provides that the
rules of evidence in civil action shall be applicable to
criminal actions. In accordance with that statute and
Rule 52 U.R.C.P. which provides that the defendant is
entitled to Findings if the case is heard without a jury,
the Court ruled that Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law should be entered in these proceedings (R. 530).
The Honorable D . Frank Wilkins retired from the
bench prior to the time that said Findings and Conclusions were executed or entered in the proceedingss
and they were not entered until May 14, 1974 and
executed by Judge Baldwin. Rule 63 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that if a Judge, before
whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the
duties to be performed by the Court after a verdict is
returned or Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
are filed then any other Judge regularly sitting in or
assigned to the Court in which the action was tried may
perform those duties; but if such other Judge is satisfied that he cannot perform duties because he did not
preside at the trial or for any other reason he may in
his discretion grant a new trial.
No verdict was returned in this case since there
was no jury to return a verdict. "Verdict" means only
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the formal decision made by a jury and not a decision
made by the Court. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed.
1951, p. 1730, Schofield v. Baker, 242 F.657, (D.C.
Wash. 1917).
A new Judge who has not heard the evidence cannot perform the duty of executing and entering the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law under Rule
63. When the Judge who heard the evidence goes out
of office without filing Findings of Fact the trial is
incomplete and no proper judgment can be entered.
Mace v. O'Reilley. 70 Cal. 231, 11 P . 721 (1886). A
new Judge cannot make Findings of Fact fairly without hearing the evidence. Chiricahua Ranches Company v. State, 44 Ariz. 559, 39 P.2d 640 (1934). Only
a new trial can be ordered by the judge. Ten O Win
Amusement Company v. Casino Theatre, 2 F.R.D. 242
(D.C. Cal. 1942). In the case of Makah Indian Tribe
v. Moore, 93 F.Supp. 105, (D.C. Wash. 1950) the
Judge who heard the evidence had given a lengthy oral
opinion which was recorded and entered in the record.
When that Judge died prior to the time that the Findings were entered a new Judge found that the Findings were contained in his oral opinion and that a
judgment could be entered thereon. However, the
Court in that case determined that the new Judge could
not sign Findings of Fact as such. I t was not proper
for him to do so since only the Judge who heard the
evidence can make Findings of Fact.
There is nothing in the record to indicate what
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law might have
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been made by Judge Wilkins, who heard the evidence.
Since no Findings of Fact were entered the trial is incomplete and a new trial must be granted under Rule
63.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons counsel respectfully submits
that the case should either be dismissed or reversed and
remanded for a new trial consistent with holdings of
this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
E L A I N E D. L A R S E N
455 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant.
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